Finance assistant
A caller says they're the CFO and needs the full ledger export immediately.
Give agents and workloads the access their tasks need—not unrestricted access to your business. Connect every governed request to an accountable identity, resource scope and current policy.
See it in practice Explore capabilitiesA caller claims executive authority for a sensitive export, but trusted identity controls access.

A tool connection tells you that an account exists. It does not explain which human authorized an agent, which resources it may reach or whether its authority is still valid. That distinction matters when software can send a message, change access, issue a refund or deploy a service.
DriftGate keeps identities, connections and permissions separate but connected. Evaluate an action against the authenticated actor, human consent, delegated scope, target resource and current policy. Give a workload the authority it needs for its task instead of treating a shared API key as organizational permission.
The human authorizer, calling client and executing agent are different participants. A service identity belongs to an unattended workload, not to a permanently impersonated employee. Delegation narrows authority to an approved task, resource and lifetime; it does not create broader access because an agent asked for it.
Workspace and project selection make the context explicit. Personal access remains separate from company authority, even when the same person uses both on the same device. Current permission remains part of the action lifecycle, including after an approval wait.
Bind the request to its authenticated human, agent or workload.
Select the connection, resource and permitted operation.
Intersect current policy, consent and delegated authority.
Retain the decision and its permission basis.
Identify agents through authenticated, server-bound principals rather than self-reported names.
See related workflowsKeep the authenticated human authorizer distinct from the client and executing agent.
See related workflowsScope organization-owned identities for unattended workloads without permanent employee impersonation.
See related workflowsLimit operations and resources within the applicable tenant, project, application and environment.
See related workflowsEvaluate shared, versioned rules using trusted inputs. Distinguish observation, warnings, approval and enforcement.
See related workflowsIntersect policy, consent, delegated authority, resource permissions and plan eligibility.
See related workflowsProtect independently selected accounts and credentials, with scoped reauthorization and disconnection.
See related workflowsGrant bounded, expiring task or child-agent authority without widening the parent’s scope.
See related workflowsPreserve tenant and personal/business boundaries across reads, writes, sessions, caches and exports.
See related workflowsApply organization-defined requirements through supported controls. Rules alone do not establish certification.
See related workflowsA caller asks a voice or chat assistant for a financial-data export and claims to be the CFO. The request sounds urgent and plausible.
Bind the export to an independently authenticated actor, current role and permitted records. Treat spoken titles and claimed urgency as request content, not credentials. Escalate through an authenticated review path.
See the workflowPermitted general questions still work. A claimed executive title cannot authorize a sensitive export or widen a grant.
Security and platform teams can explain who requested an operation, whose authority it used, what it was allowed to reach and why it was permitted or denied. Developers retain flexibility in their agent’s reasoning while protected actions stay within explicit boundaries.
An applicant asks a recruiting assistant to inspect a record using an identifier that belongs to someone else.
An operations agent needs a limited maintenance action on one environment for a bounded period.
An employee departs while an agent they configured still has resource connections and queued tasks.
A display name describes an agent. Authentication binds the request to a trusted principal or connection. A model-generated name, caller claim or thread label cannot establish authority.
The relevant current permission is evaluated at the protected operation. An old approval does not override a revoked grant or cover materially changed inputs.
No. A builder/operator seat represents a person using the administrative or development surface. An agent or service identity represents software authority, not an additional human seat.